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Basel II and Developing Countries: 
 








Despite recently announced delays, Basel II - the new standard for bank 
capital - is due to be completed this year for implementation in the 13 Basel 
Committee member countries by the end of 2006. Should the other 170 plus 
member countries of the World Bank also adopt Basel II? Basel II was not 
written with developing countries in mind, but that does not necessarily mean 
that there is nothing in it for developing countries or that it can be ignored.  
Basels I and II represent a wide "Sea of Standards".  This paper suggests five 
alternative island-standards and five navigational tools to help countries 
choose their preferred island within the sea. It is suggested that for some 
developing countries the standardized approach will yield little in terms of 
linking regulatory capital to risk, but that countries may need many years of 
work to adopt the more advanced internal rating-based approach.  The paper 
then proposes a centralized rating-based approach as a transition measure. The 
paper also makes proposals regarding a set of largely unresolved cross-border 
issues. 
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1. Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
Despite recently announced delays, the members of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision remain set to implement a new Accord on bank capital, 
replacing the 1988 Basel I agreement, by 2006
2. A natural question, and the 
focus of this paper is, what should the remainder of the 184 members of the 
World Bank do
3?  Should non-G10+ countries also implement Basel II, as 
many of them have implemented Basel I?  If so, which of the many 
alternatives under Basel II should be adopted?  The alternatives under Basel I 
and Basel II now represent such a wide “sea of standards” there appears to be 
need for navigational aids.  This policy paper represents a first attempt to 
develop a navigational chart. 
 
The World Bank’s “client countries” range from a relatively small number of 
more sophisticated emerging economies to a relatively large number of 
countries that, to date, are still struggling to bring banking regulatory and 
supervisory standards to international “best practices”
4.  The experience from 
the World Bank’s and IMF’s surveillance of financial standards indicates that 
50% of countries are only compliant with a maximum of 10 of the 30 Basel 
Core Principles (BCPs) of Effective  Banking Supervision and one-third are 
only compliant with a maximum of 5 BCPs
5.  The statistics for developing 
countries lag this mixed group.  The average developing country is compliant 
with just 7 BCPs.  The corresponding figure for developed countries is 19, 
implying there is still work to be done across the board  – see Figure 1. 
 
                                                           
2 The members of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), responsible for the development of 
Basel II, come from the Central Banks of 13 countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.  There is 
an implicit understanding within these countries that the new Accord will be implemented in each jurisdiction 
although there is no legally binding international treaty to this effect. In the words of the BIS website the 
BCBS, “formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice 
in the expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements 
- statutory or otherwise - which are best suited to their own national systems”. 
3 The World Bank website lists 184 countries with voting rights in the IBRD. Not all countries listed have 
individual bank regulators (e.g.: the countries of the East Caribbean Currency Union) and in a few cases a 
country may have more than one e.g.:  Hong Kong is not included in the 184. 
4 I will refer to the non-G10+, “non-Committee” or World Bank client countries that are the focus of this 
paper henceforth as developing countries noting that this label includes a very diverse group of economies. 
5 In fact there are 25 BCP’s.  Here I count the sub principles of Core Principle 1 as Principles in their own 
right. The figure is calculated on the basis of a survey of 60 (developed and developing) countries.   5
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In environments where banking supervision is weak, attempting to implement 
sophisticated ways of calculating required bank capital may simply give 
regulated institutions more ways to game their regulators. Where regulatory 
resources are particularly thin, this negative will dominate any positive gains 
of attempting to link bank capital more to risk. Moreover, the thin regulatory 
resources will be deflected away from where the priorities should lie. 
 
Most countries will surely need to continue to implement more fully the Basel 
Core Principles.  Where BCP compliance and hence supervisory discipline is 
weak, countries would be advised to focus primarily on Basel Pillars 2 and 3 
rather than Pillar 1.  Indeed, such countries may wish to consider measures to 
enhance complementary market discipline that go beyond Basel II, Pillar 3. 
 
However, countries that are applying Basel I and satisfy the Core Principles to 
a reasonable minimum may wish to introduce particular aspects of Basel II. 
Indeed it is argued that as countries have implemented Basel I in different 
ways, so too they should be able to implement Basel II adjusting certain 
aspects to their own country characteristics. A potential problem with this 
approach is that the essence of a “standard” is lost.  Hence I define below   6
Basel II-a and Basel II-b as suggested “sub-standards” that might be useful 
benchmarks. 
 
Moreover, many developing countries now have had the benefit of foreign 
bank entry. In many cases this has increased competition, efficiency and 
improved financial stability. These “internationally active” banks are precisely 
the ones that will be implementing the more advanced approaches of Basel II 
on a worldwide, consolidated basis. While efficiency considerations may 
suggest harmonization of supervisory methods, different legal environments 
and different levels of regulatory resources may necessitate different 
approaches. Moreover, if a subsidiary of a foreign bank is a relatively large 
bank for a host country, but small compared to the bank’s global operations, 
home and host supervisory priorities may differ. Home-host regulatory and 
supervisory issues are already present under Basel I but they are accentuated 
under Basel II for two reasons: a) Basel II includes different alternatives so 
there is greater scope for multiple regulatory treatment, and b) within the 
different Basel II approaches, there is a set of cross-border issues that to date 
remain largely unresolved. 
 
Finally, there is a group of more sophisticated emerging countries that may 
find that they fall between two stools.  On the one hand, developing country 
regulators may consider that the internal rating based (IRB) approach gives 
too much autonomy to banks or that the approach is too complex or too 
difficult to monitor - at least for the coming years.  Necessary conditions for 
IRB implementation include a) the ability to demonstrate (using actual data 
and modern credit risk modeling techniques) that the calibration of the model 
is reasonable for the task at hand, and b) that supervisors are in a position to 
properly monitor banks’ rating methodologies and how the mapping from 
rating to default probability has been assigned and tested
6. On the other hand, 
some emerging countries may feel that the Standardized Approach will give 
little in terms of linking capital to risk due to low rating penetration. 
 
For these more advanced emerging countries, a Centralized Rating Based 
(CRB) approach is advocated as a transition tool to IRB.  Under this approach 
banks would rate their borrowers but the rating scale, and how the ratings then 
mapped to default probabilities, would be determined by the regulator. 
Moreover, given the changes underway to the Basel II proposals related to 
                                                           
6 As Basel I has been applied across the world with different capital ratios, Basel II calibration may also be 
questioned for developing countries. If there are not the data or expertise to demonstrate appropriate 
calibration, then a simpler approach should probably be adopted.   7
expected and unexpected loss, this approach could be used to determine 
forward looking provisions, building on current policies in some countries, 
while the regulator adopted the Standardized Approach under Basel II for 
capital.  This is explained in more detail below. 
 
Basel II was not written primarily with developing countries in mind. Indeed a 
variety of institutions are now suggesting that many developing countries may 
wish to stick with Basel I - despite its well-known drawbacks.  However, the 
issues that Basel II raises will undoubtedly shape an important part of the 
dialog regarding the improvement of banking regulation and supervision going 
forward.  Moreover, the spectrum of regulatory approaches now encompassed 
in Basels I and II is very wide indeed. The intention of this paper is to discuss 
the options available and attempt to suggest, in a constructive manner, how to 
navigate safely and efficiently through this sea of standards. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, as background I 
discuss what is new in Basel II and whether it is relevant to developing 
countries. In section three, particular navigational aids for the sea of standards 
are introduced.  In particular I suggest that there are five characteristics that 
might provide a useful way to think about the most appropriate alternatives on 
offer.  Section four lists salient and largely unresolved cross-border issues 
with some specific proposals
7. In section five of the paper I discuss a simple 
approach to check the calibration of the Basel II advanced approaches for 
emerging countries
8.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                           
7 These issues are explored in more depth in a separate planned note. 
8 Basel I has been applied in many countries with higher minimum capital ratios than Basel’s recommended 
8%.  Recent papers have indicated that higher minimum capital ratios may be required for Basel II also.  See 
Balzarotti, Castro and Powell (2003) and Majnoni, Miller and Powell (2004).   8
 
 
2. Basel II: What’s new and is it relevant to developing countries? 
 
2.1 An Overview 
 
At first glance, the Basel II documentation is daunting.  The New Accord 
currently runs to 216 pages, but there are literally thousands of pages of 
supporting documents depending on definitions
9.  The new Accord consists of 
3 Pillars: (1) Minimum Capital Requirements, (2) Supervisory Review Process 
and (3) Market Discipline.  However, to understand what’s new about Basel 
II, the Capital Accords need to be placed the context of the (wider) Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs). 
 
Figure 2 gives a very simple graphical representation of the Basel standards.  
The idea of the figure is the following.  The Basel Core Principles cover a 
great deal of ground and more than encapsulate Basel I
10. This is indicated in 
the figure as Basel I is depicted as totally within the space of the BCPs.  
Indeed, BCP number 6 on capital adequacy is normally understood as more 
general than any particular capital adequacy standard and arguably calls for 
the application of Basel I as a minimum
11. 
                                                           
9 There are 216 pages to the English language .pdf version of the Third Consultative Paper (CP3), although 
there are 226 if one downloads the new Accord section by section.  In other languages, the Accord is 
somewhat longer. The BIS website lists 103 documents published by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) responsible for Basel II.  While not all these documents are strictly relevant to Basel II, 
more than 50% would probably be deemed relevant and the average document length is well-over 20 pages. 
10 The Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision are generally subdivided into 7 areas, (i) 
Objectives, autonomy powers and resources (BCP 1.1-1.6), (ii) Licensing and structure (BCP 2-5) (iii) 
Prudential regulations and requirements (BCP 6-15) (iv) Methods of on-going supervision (BCP 16-20) (v) 
Information requirements (BCP 21) (vi) Remedial measures and exit (BCP 22) (vii) Cross border banking 
(BCP 23-25).. 
11 A counter argument is that Basel I is only intended for “internationally active banks” and hence may be 
considered to go beyond what would be required under the capital adequacy assessment for the BCPs.  
However, if Basel I is the minimum for larger, more diversified institutions, then in the context of a 
developing country, it seems reasonable that it should also be considered a minimum for smaller and more 
concentrated institutions.  Many developing countries have implemented Basel I for all banks and, with 
stricter limits, reflecting this view.  This is evident analyzing the World Bank, bank regulation database 
available on www.worldbank.org. 
 
   9
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Basel II, Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review) is very largely also encompassed by 
the BCPs; there is actually relatively little new in Pillar 2 – we discuss what’s 
new in more detail below. There is more that’s new regarding Pillar 3 (Market 
Discipline) but its really in Pillar 1 where most of the innovation of Basel II 
lies.  While Pillar 1’s so-called “simplified standardized” approach (SS) might 
almost overlap with Basel I, Pillar 1 goes well beyond the BCPs, when all the 
alternatives under the Standardized Approach (SA) and the Internal Rating 
Based approach (IRB) are considered. 
 
One important general issue regarding what’s new in Basel II relates to 
consolidated supervision
12. Arguably Basel II takes as granted that there is 
consolidated supervision and then takes it to a higher level.  Consolidated 
                                                           
12 The first sentence of BCBS (2003a) reads, “The ... (New Accord) will be applied on a consolidated basis to 
internationally active banks”.. By consoldiated supervision in this document I refer to the consiolidated 
supervision of banks.  This is quite distinct from the issue of whether regulatory agencies should be integrated 
into a single agency.  Logically a country can have separate agencies for financial regulation (still the norm 
although integration is increasing) and consolidated supervision for banks or integrated agencies and banking 
supervision that still does not comply with Basel’s definition of, “consoldiated supervision”.  See BCBS 
(2003a), pages 1-5 on the Scope of the Accord.   10
supervision is included in the BCP’s but the data on BCP compliance (BCP 
20) indicate that it is an area where many countries fail
13. Indeed BCP 20 has 
the highest percentage of countries in either non-compliance or material non-
compliance than any other Basel Core Principle and this area is singled out for 
special mention in a recent paper by the World Bank and the IMF on concerns 
regarding the pattern of BCP compliance
14. 
 
If we extend consolidation to the cross-border variety (BCP number 23), then 
the picture becomes even more worrisome.  Cross-border here might include 
an “offshore bank” owned by a national bank or a retail or other type of bank 
operating in another jurisdiction. In the case of developing countries, 
especially those with a history of capital flight, cross-border consolidation can 
be important. In Latin America in particular such institutions have been the 
source of serious problems and regulators frequently do not have the 
appropriate authority, enforcement powers or information
15.  
 
The aim of Basel II is that banking supervisors will consolidate from the 
holding company of a banking group down and not just traditional 
consolidation, i.e., down from the bank within a holding group.  This change 
is understandable given the changing face of financial group structures in 
many countries, but as many developing countries do not have traditional 





                                                           
13 The wording in the new Accord does allow for a national supervisor not to consolidate all entities within a 
group (paragraphs 7 and 8 of the CP3).  However, the spirit of the Accord is clearly towards a deeper level of 
consolidation and in those instances where an entity within a group is not consolidated a) it must be subject to 
other (appropriate) regulation, b) it remains imperative that banking supervisors still have sufficient 
information on those entities and c) all investment in those entities must be deducted from capital. As the 
paragraph on the BCP surveillance indicates, many countries fail on the current definition of consolidated 
supervision let alone the more ambitious Basel II version. 
14 “Implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Experiences, Influences 
and Perspectives”, World Bank and IMF, Sept 23 2002. 
15 In the case of Argentina an essentially unregulated offshore operation caused the first bank to close during 
the Tequila crisis, in late 1994, and in Ecuador the offshore sector was a source of considerable problems and 
eventually was even granted a deposit guarantee in the banking crisis of 1999/2000. 
16 On the other hand, Basel II is decidedly weak on investments in non-financial companies and on related 
lending.  Basel II is the first time that the BCBS has introduced specific rules on something like related 
lending.  The rule in the proposals is that any single investment above 15% of bank capital (and aggregate 
investments of this type over 60% of capital) would be deducted from bank capital.  Moreover, below this 
limit the investment would attract a 100% risk weight under the standardized approach and at least that under 
the IRB approach.  Many developing countries already have stricter rules including actual limits and not just 
deductions from capital over a given threshold.  Ecuador has the strictest rules I am aware of where the limit 
is literally zero i.e.: a bank cannot lend to a “related” party.  Related lending is covered in BCP 10.   11
2.2 What’s new in Basel II, Pillar 2: Supervisory Review 
 
Pillar 2 actually covers very little material that is not already in the Basel Core 
Principles but is more specific on a number of issues. This serves a useful 
purpose for developing countries, as compliance regarding Pillar II type issues 
within the Basel Core Principles remains particularly weak.  Pillar 2 starts 
with four key principles and then lists a set of “other risks” that banks and 
supervisors need to consider that  did not make it into Pillar 1 regarding actual 
quantitative requirements.   
 
The four key principles commence with the responsibility of the bank (a set of 
internal processes for assessing capital adequacy including not only credit risk 
but also market risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk) and second the 
responsibility of the supervisor
17. Third, Pillar 2 states categorically that 
supervisors should normally “expect” banks to operate with capital above the 
regulatory minimum and should have the ability to require banks to have more 
than any standard minimum amount (this relates to BCP 6 on capital adequacy 
and BCP 1 on the legal framework and enforcement).  And fourth it states that 
supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage in the case of problem 
institutions (which again relates to BCP 1; enforcement authority and 
independence and also BCP 22 on remedial measures). 
 
After the four key principles, Pillar 2 lists a set of “other risks” that a bank 
must be capable of analyzing including interest rate risk, credit concentration 
risk and liquidity risk
18.  In this list I have not included market risk where 
Basel II represents no material change to Basel I’s “Market Risk 
Amendment”
19.  To a large extent these “other risks” are risks that banks need 
to monitor carefully, but where there is not (yet) agreement on whether or how 
quantitative requirements could be developed. 
 
Pillar 2 is particularly relevant here for two reasons.  First, many countries 
continue to fall short of complying with the key principles of supervision.  
Figure 3 plots BCP compliance for a set of key core principles for a sample of 
developing countries (see the Appendix for a key and a figure that shows 
developing country compliance with all BCPs). 
                                                           
17 Related to BCP 11-14 and BCP 16-19 respectively. 
18 Covered by BCP 12 and 13. 
19 Covered in BCP 12.   12
 
 
Figure 3: Developing Country Basel Core Principle Compliance 
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It is striking that over 40% of developing countries are non-compliant or 
materially non-compliant with several critical BCPs that relate to Pillar 2.  
These include BCPs 11,12 and 13 (that banks have systems to measure, 
monitor and control transfer risks, market risks and all other material risks), 
BCP 10 (on related lending), BCP 22 (on prompt adequate remedial actions), 
and BCP 1.2 (on the skills, resources and independence of the supervisory 
agency) and BCP 10 on connected lending. 
 
The second reason Pillar 2 is highly relevant is that the “other risks” tend to be 
particularly important in the often-volatile context of developing country 
banking.   countries with liquid financial markets, such risks can frequently be 
thought of as price risks and banks can frequently manage such risks with 
market-traded instruments. Banks may take risks but those risks can normally 
be quantified reasonably accurately and they can normally be priced and 
insured.  These risks in developing countries tend to be much more systemic 
in nature and are more difficult to price and to insure – all due to a lack of 
deep financial markets- and in the final instance, they tend to manifest 
themselves as liquidity risks.  Hence what might look like a maturity 
mismatch in domestic currency (and hence considered an interest rate risk) 
may swiftly turn into a high demand for dollar currency and a liquidity risk 
and a sharp change in the currency composition of a bank’s balance sheet. 
 
The appropriate treatment of such systemic risks – and the degree to which 
banks should insure against them  – is an area where as yet banks and their 
supervisors have only very partial answers.  The high liquidity ratios in many 
higher-quality developing country banks, indicates the severity of the problem 
and the lack of compliance with BCPs 12-13, on market and other risks, 
therefore particularly worrying.  
 
In summary, while Pillar 2 may not contain too much that is really new, the 
issues remain highly relevant to developing countries
20.  There is no doubt that 
if all countries truly adopted Basel II, Pillar 2 this would represent a 





                                                           
20 There are some sections of Pillar 2 that are only relevant for countries wishing to apply the more advanced 
approaches in Basel II, Pillar 1 that may be less relevant.   14
2.3 What’s new in Basel II, Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
 
Pillar 3 is entitled “market discipline”.  However, it focuses largely on the 
appropriate disclosure of bank capital and capital adequacy. Basel I did not 
make specific reference to what banks must disclose to the public and, as the 
focus of the BCP’s is “supervisory discipline”, their focus is on reporting 
(what a bank must know and report to the supervisor) rather than disclosure to 
the market. Pillar 3 is then new; but is it relevant? 
 
Pillar 3 first dictates how a banking group should disclose figures depending 
on how that group is consolidated.  Here a definition of the over-riding 
concept of materiality gives a substantial responsibility and discretion to the 
bank to decide what disclosures are relevant to that institution
21. Second, Pillar 
3 includes disclosure requirements on capital structure (tier 1 versus tiers 2 
and 3) and third on capital adequacy both in the aggregate (across the group 
and for each significant bank subsidiary), by portfolio and by type of risk 
reflecting the different portfolios and “risks” as defined in Pillar 1 (see below). 
There are also disclosure requirements for credit risk, for the risk of equity 
investments, for credit risk mitigation techniques, for securitization risks, for 
market risks, for operational risk and for interest rate risk in the banking book. 
 
Developing country financial sectors are typically characterized by 1) banks 
that are closely held, 2) opaque information regarding bank and associated 
economic groups and 3) thin and illiquid markets for non-insured bank debt. 
Assuming consolidation rules and materiality are appropriately applied 
(implying effective monitoring and enforcement), enhanced disclosure of bank 
capital would indeed be useful in such environments.  On these grounds and 
with these qualifications, Pillar 3 may then be considered to be relevant for 
many developing countries. 
 
However, to significantly enhance market discipline would probably call for 
other (more general) policies and there is much of Pillar 3 that appears highly 
specific. For example there is much in Pillar 3 on disclosures related to the 
IRB approaches in Pillar 1 that may be largely irrelevant for most developing 
countries. There has been much attention recently in academic circles on 
market discipline in banking and there have been several proposals on how it 
                                                           
21 Of course if a subsidiary is really non-material then arguably it need not be consolidated, if it is 
consolidated then arguably it should be thought of as material.  Pillar 3 however does not say this and one 
presumes that at the discretion of the bank and its main regulator , some subsidiaries might be consolidated 
but not considered material and hence their individual capital adequacy not disclosed.  This is relevant to 
World Bank client countries as discussed below.    15
might be enhanced.  There appears to be reasonably general agreement that the 
market may play a complementary role in both monitoring and discipline but 
less agreement on the specific instruments to achieve that goal especially in 




An interesting issue with respect to Pillar 3 relates to the disclosures that home 
supervisors will require of international bank subsidiaries in host countries.  
We come back to this cross-border issue in Section 4.  On balance, Pillar 3 is 
relevant to developing countries but many may find the proposals highly 
specific. It would certainly be useful for the Basel Committee to extend Pillar 
1’s  Simplified Standardized Approach to Pillar 3.  Finally, in those 
environments where traditional supervision is weak, there remains an urgent 
need for the consideration of complementary measures to enhance market 
discipline more widely. 
 
2.4 What’s new in Basel II, Pillar 1 (Quantitative Requirements) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, Pillar 1 is where most of the real innovation in Basel 
II lies.  This paper will not offer another description of Pillar 1 rather the focus 
on what’s new and what’s relevant for developing countries. 
                                                           
22 By monitoring I refer to the generation of information and by discipline the reaction of the bank to that 
information – either pre-emptive or forced by the market or by the supervisor.  The reason that the market 
may be complementary to supervisors in both activities is that a) information sets may not be the same and b) 
the incentives to act on the information may differ.  In particular, the market may play an important role in 
limiting supervisory forbearance. 
23 Argentina in the mid 1990’s probably went further than any other country in this regard. The regulator 
combined strong rules regarding disclosure of information (I) with strict rules on auditing (A) to validate that 
information, with forcing each financial institutions to have a credit rating (C) and to issue uninsured bonds 
subordinated to other claims (B). Combined with traditional supervision (S), the letters made the acronym 
BASIC which was the name given to the system.  See Calomiris and Powell (2000) for a review.   16
 




The four main Pillar 1 approaches are indicated in the rows of Figure 4: (i) the 
Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA), (ii) the Standardidized Approach 
(SA), (iii) the IRB Foundation approach and (iv) the IRB Advanced approach.  
The four columns of the figure represent four topics covered in Pillar 1: (a) 
basic credit risk assessment, (b) credit risk mitigation, (c) securitization risk 
and (d) operational risk.  The content of the matrix gives a brief summary of 
how each topic may be dealt with in each approach, elaborated on in the text 
below. 
 
2.4.1 The Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA) 
 
The Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA) is not so much a different 
approach as a collection of the simpler alternatives across the different topics 
– credit risk measurement, credit risk mitigation, securitization and operational 
risk.  The SSA approach is the closest to Basel I as regarding basic credit risk 
measurement there is only, in the first instance, a finer calibration of capital to 
risk for sovereigns through the use of average official Export Credit Agency 
Basic Credit Risk Credit Risk Mitigation Securitization Risks Operational Risk
The Approaches Measurement Technique
Simplified Standardized Export Credit Agencies Simple: risk weight of SSA banks can only invest Basic Indicator:
(www.oecd.org, Trade collateral subsitutes that of (cannot offer Capital=15% Gross Income
Directorate, ECA page) claim. enhancements or liquidity
facilities). Riskweight=100%
Standardized Approach Export Credit Agencies Simple: (as above). Standardized: uses export Basic Indicator. Or
or Credit Rating Agencies Comprehensive: exposure credit agency ratings Standardized Approach where
(eg: S&P, Moody's, Fitch) amount reduced subject to (only investing banks can Requirement is weighted sum
claim and collateral haircuts. use below BB+) of gross income across activities
IRB Foundation Banks' internal ratings Comprehensive, then IRB Approach: Investing More sophisitcated banks will be
for default probability LGD adjusted given banks may use Bank expected to graduate to the
and Basel II formula reduction in exposure and Ratings. Originators may Advanced Measurement Approach
sets capital requirement capital requirement given use Supervisory Formula where capital requirement given by
(Loss Given Default 45% by Basel formula own risk measurement system.
for Senior and 75% Subord).
IRB Advanced Banks set internal rating Own model determines LGD As IRB Foundation As IRB Foundation
(default probability), LGD and EAD and capital
Exposure At Default and requirement given by forumula
Maturity. Capital requirement
still given by Basel formula.  17
ratings - to be published on the OECD’s website
24. Corporate claims would 
continue to attract a minimum 8% capital charge.  Considering the 
implementation of Basel II in a developing country banking system, sovereign 
ratings are frequently less important as banks tend not to lend too much of 
their portfolio abroad and in that case the SSA is then similar to Basel I across 
the board 8% minimum requirement. 
 
However, even under SSA’s basic approach to credit risk there are some 
differences to Basel I.  First, there is a difference in lending to a bank’s own 
sovereign – or holding bonds of the sovereign in an investment account.  If the 
loan is funded and lent in the sovereign’s own currency, then this may attract a 
zero capital charge minimum but, if not, it would attract the charge relevant to 
the (Export Credit Agency) rating of the sovereign
25.  Second, the altered 
sovereign ratings feed into different ratings for banks
26.  Third, Basel II SSA 
would allow residential mortgages to have a minimum 35% risk weight (under 
Basel I this was 50%), and fourth a 75% minimum the retail exposures and 
fifth a 150% weight for loans in arrears if provisions are less than 20% 
(previously this was not specified and hence 100% with the presumption that 
provisioning would increase)
27.  Six, there is a subtle change for short term 
lending to banks. Under Basel I, shorter-term loans (initially under 12 months 
and then reduced to 6 months) to banks attracted a 20% charge. Under SSA, 
the normal procedure would be that bank loans to other banks had a capital 
requirement that corresponded to one rating worse than the sovereign. 
However, if the loans were under 3 months, funded and lent in the own-
currency of the country, and the country used the zero risk weight for lending 
to the sovereign, then a more generous treatment might apply.  However, for a 
developing country with a non-investment grade rating this would certainly be 
higher than the previous 20% treatment. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, SSA would imply the introduction of a capital 
requirement (and associated supervisory monitoring and enforcement) for 
                                                           
24 The advantage of this is that it replaces the old “OECD rule” under which sovereign members of the OECD 
attracted a zero capital charge whereas non-OECD members attracted 8%. 
25 Again, this refers to the replacement of the Basel I “OECD rule”.  However, this was rarely applied to a 
bank’s own sovereign and hence there was something of a vacuum.  It is not clear whether developing 
countries will apply Basel II as written when it comes to bank’s own sovereign.  In practice, there is a 
growing list of developing countries that do already apply capital charges to lending to their own sovereign 
and that go beyond Basel II.  This is an area where further consideration is certainly required. 
26 Under SSA loans to other banks attract a capital requirement that corresponds to one rating “bucket” worse 
than the sovereign itself. 
27 To obtain the capital requirement the risk weight must be multiplied by the basic capital requirement – the 
minimum in Basel II as in Basel I is 8%.   18
Operational Risk.  Here SSA uses what is referred to as the Basic Indicator 
approach, discussed below, that boils down to a capital requirement of 15% of 
a bank’s gross annual operating income (based on a 3 year average). 
 
The SSA is likely to be relevant for developing countries because it represents 
the simplest way to comply with Basel II.  Indeed, the SSA was developed in 
part with developing countries in mind.  However the real question is, does it 
imply an improvement to Basel I?  The use of Export Credit Agency ratings 
for sovereign exposures provides little in terms of linking capital to risk for 
developing country banks.  It is unlikely that the reductions in minimum 
requirements for mortgages are appropriate for developing countries that tend 
to be weak on creditor protection or have slow and inefficient legal systems.  
And the reductions in capital requirements for retail exposures may not be 
appropriate where there is high systemic risk and little real diversification.  
The preferential treatment in lending to a bank’s own sovereign may be more 
relevant to higher rated countries than those with weaker ratings where many 
would advise supervisors to take a much tougher stance.  Moreover, it will be 
interesting to see how many developing countries supervisors apply the export 
credit agency ratings that may be politically associated to the OECD, to 
lending to their own sovereign. It seems likely that the situation here may 
remain as it is now with developing countries following their own rules. 
 
The main change will then be with regards to operational risk.  As discussed 
below, this will tend to increase capital requirements for developing countries 
that apply SSA (or even SA)
28.  As discussed below a quantitative impact 
study that focuses squarely on developing countries is clearly required 
urgently to consider the effects
29. 
 
2.4.2 The Standardized Approach 
 
The Standardized Approach (SA) adds the possibility of using private credit 
Rating Agencies as well as Export Credit Agencies to establish credit risk 
assessments that would then feed into capital requirements. As credit rating 
agencies rate corporates and banks, as well as sovereigns, this adds the 
possibility of using these assessments to link capital to risk more finely. 
                                                           
28 However, there may be little difference between applying SSA at 8%, but including operational risk, with 
Basel I but a higher requirement 
29 The BCBS has conducted 3 quantitative impact studies - see BCBS (2003c) - but the results are presented 
on banks from the 13, “committee countries” and, we are told, 30 “other countries”.  The other countries then 
include industrialized, developing and offshore centers.  It is then difficult to disentagle the effects of the 
different components of changes in capital requirements for developing country banks.   19
 
There has been much discussion and criticism on the use of external credit 
rating agencies for bank regulatory capital purposes. Much of this has focused 
on sovereign credit assessments and whether rating agencies do a good job, 
whether their ratings lead or follow the market and whether their use may 
increase bank pro-cyclicality
30. These issues are however more related to 
sovereign risk and the implementation of Basel II internationally than the 
domestic implementation of Basel II in developing countries; the principle 





Considering the domestic implementation of the SA across the globe, the main 
problem is the very low penetration of Credit Rating Agencies. This means 
that most claims will be rated 100% and so there would be no change with 
respect to Basel I or the SSA.  And moreover, the claims that are rated are 
arguably not where the very serious credit risks lie. Such companies in 
                                                           
30 See Powell (2003) for a discussion of these issues. 
Box 1: Basel II Standardized Approach
This box illustrates how ratings (in this case a Standard & Poor's scale) map
into risk weights for Basel II SA banks adopting the SA.  Risk weights must
be multiplied by 100% to obtain the relevant capital requirement.
AAA to A+ to BBB+ to BB+ to Below B- Unrated
AA- A- BBB- B-
Claims on Sovereigns
0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%
Claims on Banks Option 1 (rating refers to sovereign)
20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Claims on Banks Option 2 (rating refers to bank)
20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50%
Claims on Banks Option 3 (preferential treatment for short term claims)
20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20%
Claims on Corporates
AAA to A+ to BBB+ to Below BB-Unrated
AA- A- BB-
20% 50% 100% 150% 100%  20
developing countries have a rating because they have issued some kind of debt 
instrument and hence probably already have some external investors.  It is 
precisely the corporations that are not quoted and have not issued and hence 
that probably do not have a rating where more information is required. 
 
A similar argument, regarding the penetration of rating agencies, could be 
made for the portfolio of regional banks in the US or Europe but the 
significant difference is that such banks do not represent a systemic risk to the 
banking system
31. In the case of many developing countries, it is the bulk of 
the portfolios of the major banks that are not rated. 
 
This may limit the attractiveness of the SA for some countries or, if 
implemented, may imply that there is a strong pressure for companies to 
obtain a rating quickly (assuming it is a reasonably good one) and hence 
provoking a potential deterioration in the quality the ratings. 
 
2.4.3 The Internal Rating Based Approaches (IRB) 
 
Most pages of the Pillar 1 proposals are devoted to the more advanced IRB 
methodologies. IRB gives a significant degree of autonomy to banks to define 
their own rating scales and to use those scales to determine default 
probabilities. While the debate in G10 has been couched in terms of how the 
IRB approaches do not give banks sufficient discretion to use their own 
internal credit risk models (that may model risk diversification directly), the 
debate in developing countries is more that the IRB approach would give 
banks greater autonomy hence making monitoring and control more difficult 
tasks, especially given the tight supervisory resources and deficiencies in 
BCP-compliance discussed above. 
 
The IRB approach consists of two sub-approaches; Foundation and Advanced.  
In the Foundation approach, banks estimate probabilities of default for each 
borrower
32. In the Advanced approach banks estimate Probability of Default 
and other parameters such as Loss Given Default and Exposure at Default.   
These estimates are then fed into a formula or a “curve” that gives the actual 
capital requirement.  It is understood that the formula is calibrated such that a 
“standard loan” (with a default probability of 1%, maturity of 2.5 years and a 
                                                           
31 This observation may be one of the reasons that have led the US authorities to say that banks in the US will 
apply Basel II, IRB or stay with Basel I.  In other words, they have viewed the costs of Basel II’s standardized 
approach as outweighing the advantages for banks that are not considered significant. 
32 In practice banks will place credits in different buckets corresponding to particular ranges of default 
probabilities.   21
loss given default of 45%) would have a capital requirement of 8%.  Loans of 
higher default-probability, longer maturity or higher loss-given-default would 
attract higher requirements. 
 
 
Box 2: The Mathematics of the Internal Ratings’ Based Approach 
 
The formula to calculate the capital requirement is a function of the Probability of Default (PD), the Loss Given Default 
(LGD), the maturity of the loan (M) and the Exposure at Default (EAD).  N(X) denotes the cumulative normal 
distribution function and G(.) the inverse cumulative normal distribution function for a standard normal variable. 
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The formula is for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures and the capital requirement is the 99.9% Value at Risk for 1 
unit of exposure.  As discussed in the text the formula is an approximation to the Value at Risk of a portfolio of 
correlated assets where asset returns are driven by a single factor. 
 
The risk weighted assets is K multiplied by the Exposure At Default (EAD) multiplied by 12.5 (=100/8) and the capital 
requirement is then 8% of the RWA as in the Basel I methodology. 
 
For smaller and medium sized enterprises (where the reported sales, of the consolidated group of which the firm is part, 
are less than 50 million Euros), an adjustment to the Correlation, R, such that this then becomes: 
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where S = sales in millions of Euros and sales of less than 5 million Euros will be set equal to 5 million allowing for the 
maximum allowable reduction in capital requirements. 
   22
 
I do not go into detail here as to how the curve was derived or calibrated.    
Suffice to say that it comes from a model of (corporate) default due to Robert 
Merton but the curve can also be thought of as “fitting” portfolio models of 
default risk including Creditmetrics or CreditRisk+
33.  The curve then contains 
an assumption regarding the covariances within a credit portfolio.  Recent 
papers that show how such a function for each individual claim may 
approximate the results of a portfolio model include Gordy (2003) and Emmer 
and Tasche (2003). Basel II IRB calibration is the subject of Section 5 below. 
 
An IRB approach may well be useful for developing countries that lack deep 
capital markets and deep penetration by external ratings agencies.  The issue 
will be whether the approach as detailed can be calibrated, implemented and 
monitored effectively in developing countries. 
 
2.4.4 Operational Risk 
 
Apart from different approaches for underlying credit risk measurement, Basel 
II also includes a specific capital requirement for Operational Risk.  As Basel I 
rested on a minimum capital charge of 8% for most claims and Basel II’s basic 
requirement is also 8%, at first sight this appears as an additional requirement 
that will increase banks’ capital requirements overall.  However, under the 
Standardardized Approach only non-rated loans, poorly rated loans or loans in 
default attract capital requirements of 8% (or higher) and in general loans will 
receive a lower credit risk capital charge under Basel II than Basel I.  Under 
IRB all loans with a lower probability of default that the “Standard loan” will 
have lower capital requirements.  However, for countries that apply the 
Simplified Standardized Approach or the Standardized approach but where 
credit rating penetration is very low, then in those cases the Operational Risk 
charge, on top of essentially an unchanged 8% requirement, may well imply a 
significant increase in capital requirements
34. 
                                                           
33 CreditMetrics is a model developed by JP Morgan offshoot, Riskmetrics and Creditrisk+ a model developed 
by Credit Suisse Financial Products of CSFB. 
34 This is supported by the results of the Basel Committee’s Quantitative Impact Study Number 3 (QIS 3 – see 
BCBS (2003c) and BCBS (2003d).  The first publication finds a 12 % increase in capital requirements for 
“other” (non G13, non EU) countries for the standardized approach.  Indeed credit risk capital requirements 
rise by 2% and operational risk capital requirements are about 11% of the current capital charge.  Curiously, 
QIS 3 also finds an 11% inccrease for large banks from G13 (and yet only a 6% increase for Eu large banks 
implying that this comes from non EU G13 countries), but then these banks will most likely not apply the 
standardized approach and will most likely apply IRB.  In BCBS (2003d), which apparently takes into 
account certain modfications of the new proposals embodied in Consultative Paper 3, no information is given 
on banks from “other countries’.   23
 
As indicated in Figure 4, there are three different approaches that can be 
adopted for the treatment of operational risk: Basic Indicator, Standardized 
and Advanced Measurement Approach.  Under the Basic Indicator approach, 
capital requirements for operational risk are simply 15% of Gross Income.  
Under the Standardized Approach capital requirements are the weighted sum 
of the gross income stemming from different sources with the weights ranging 
from 12% for gross income from the retail portfolio to 18% for gross income 
from corporate finance and trading.  Under the Advanced Measurement 
Approach the regulatory capital will be given by a risk measure generated by a 
bank’s own model of operational risk.  This model must be calibrated on the 
banks own experiences with regard to operational risk related losses and hence 




Banks opting for the Simplified Standardized Approach will adopt the Basic 
Indicator methodology for Operational Risk.  Banks adopting the Standardized 
Approach for Pillar 1 capital, in theory, can choose between any of the 
methodologies but are likely to adopt either the Basic Indicator or the 
Standardized Approach and only those banks adopting Pillar 1, IRB are likely 
to adopt the Advanced Measurement Approach for Operational Risk.  Indeed 
banks that adopt IRB are certainly expected to opt at least for the Standardized 
Approach and to graduate to an AMA approach over time. 
 
An explicit capital charge for operational risk is clearly new. It is also 
undoubtedly relevant for developing countries. While the Basel Core 
Principles require a bank to consider all risks including operational risk, to 
date there has not been a formal benchmark laid down in an international 
standard.  
 
It is likely that most banks in developing countries will not have developed 
operational risk models and will therefore adopt the Basic Indicator or the 
Standardized Approach.  The inclusion of an explicit operational-risk, capital 
charge should not in theory imply a significant increase in required 
supervisory resources, as supervisors should be assessing operational risk 
anyway.  However, as the BCP compliance data above makes clear in practice 
                                                           
35 There has been much detailed work on the identification, measurement and management of particular 
aspects of operational risk that may then feed into the AMA approach.  For example the World Bank has been 
working on E-Finance and associated operational risks including security risks – see Glaessner et al (2002) for 
example.   24
Other Risks are not well-covered by supervisors in many developing countries 
that have been assessed.  In practice there is then a need to enhance 
supervision here and Basel II may provide an incentive for extra resources to 
be provided.  Of course, whatever the precise regulation adopted, the real job 
of supervisors is to consider whether the bank has sufficient capital for its 
overall risk-profile. 
 
In terms of simply checking the capital adequacy against the regulation, the 
Basic Indicator approach would not require large resources if bank’s income 
statements are believed.  The Standardized Approach is slightly more 
problematic as banks may have the incentive to massage their income 
statements such that greater gross income appears against the business lines 
that attract the lower operational risk.  If supervisors have little experience or 
expertise, low effective control over and confidence in the veracity banks’ 
income statements, there may be an argument to staying with the Basic 
Indicator Approach. 
 
However, as countries have experimented with different levels of the basic 
capital requirement for credit risk, it may also be that countries will wish to 
consider whether the actual percentages suggested by Basel II (currently 15% 
under the Basic Indicator or the various percentages under the Standardized 
Approach) are relevant for their particular circumstances. The 15% figure was 
calibrated largely on the basis of G10 banks.  However, gross income in 
developing country banks tends to be high compared to their G10 
counterparts, perhaps reflecting higher risks but also perhaps higher costs. It is 
understood that the results of Basel’s quantitative impact study (known as 
QIS3) indicated that the operational risk charge for some developing country 
banks could be very high. The appropriate calibration of the operational risk 
capital requirement for developing countries is then an issue for continuing 
future research. 
 
2.4.5 Securitization Risk 
 
The securitization of bank-originated claims has grown enormously in recent 
years. While, in terms of size, the markets in G10 swamp those in developing 
countries, some developing countries have made significant advances in terms 
of the volumes of these transactions.  Moreover, this is an area that is 
generally deemed to be one where developing countries should advance 
further in order to enhance the supply of credit in certain areas, reduce the 
risks in the banking sector (where long term assets are frequently funded by   25
sort term deposits) and develop domestic capital markets further. One area 
where such transactions are becoming particularly important is in housing 
finance.  When a bank securitizes assets from its balance sheet it frequently 
maintains an exposure.  Basel II makes significant advances as to how these 
residual exposures should be treated depending on the structure of the 
transactions. In order to develop these markets further, it is critical to ensure 
that the incentives of the different parties including banks are appropriate. 
 
Regarding capital requirements for credit risks on a loan, Basel II allows for a 
Standardized Approach and an IRB approach to securitization risks.  Indeed a 
bank that uses the Standardized Approach for credit risk for the underlying 
exposure must use the Standardized Approach for securitization risk.  A 
Simplified Standardized Approach is also discussed, but a bank that adopts 
SSA is only allowed to invest and not originate.  This might be a significant 
restriction for developing country supervisors considering adopting the SSA 
for their entire banking systems.   
 
Moreover, normally a securitization would attract a credit rating from an 
external agency and hence it is likely that the regular Standardized Approach 
would be relevant, even within the context of a developing country.  This 
raises the possibility of employing the Export Credit Agency ratings for the 
underlying credit risk but adopting the more general SA for securitization risk. 
 
This section of the new Accord will then be relevant to World Bank client 
countries depending on the existing size and the desire to grow, domestic 
capital markets. 
 
2.4.6 Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques. 
 
Markets for credit instruments with different forms of collateral have also 
grown in many countries. In particular, repo markets in some jurisdictions are 
highly liquid with literally billions of dollars of contracts per year. The 
collateral behind such instruments is normally a government bond (either local 
or say a US Treasury) but other instruments may use a corporate or bank 
security, gold or cash.  As with securitization risk, the regulatory treatment for 
capital of such claims has lagged significantly behind the market’s design of 
the relevant transactions and banks’ own risk assessments.  Basel II makes 
significant advances here with respect to Basel I.  These proposals are then 
relevant to the extent that the development of local capital markets is seen as a 
priority in developing countries.   26
 
In the case of the standardized approach, the focus here is not on collateral as 
in a mortgage (where the risk weight is reduced in the standardized approach 
to a minimum of 35%) or other forms of real collateral where some benefit 
may be given through provisions.  Banks that employ the standardized 
approach for credit risk may adopt a Simple Approach for credit risk 
mitigation where, as in Basel I, it is the rating of the collateral rather than the 
actual obligor that is employed. 
 
In the case of developing countries, if the collateral is a security it is likely that 
this will have some type of rating and then the Simple Approach will give 
some benefit in terms of credit risk mitigation.  Indeed even where rating 
penetration is low, if securities generally used for collateralizing such 
instruments have ratings this approach may be useful.  
 
However, for developing countries with reasonably developed financial 
markets, or those that strongly wish to develop them, Basel II’s 
Comprehensive Approach may be more attractive.  The “comprehensive 
approach” allows a reduction in the effective exposure of the original claim 
depending on haircuts that increase the nominal value of the original claim 
and decrease the value of the collateral. These haircuts may be provided by the 
supervisor (see paragraph 122 of Basel 2003a) or supervisors may permit 
banks to use their own haircuts.  We note that the haircuts increase sharply for 
lower rated claims and for a sovereign with a rating in the BB- to BB+ 
category is 15%.  Sovereigns with lower ratings are not listed
36. 
 
In the case of a bank adopting the IRB approach, collateral may also include 
residential mortgages and the existence of the collateral basically feeds into 
revised estimates of Exposure At Default and Loss Given Default in somewhat 
similar vein to the comprehensive approach discussed above. 
 
From the standpoint of a developing country, paragraph 95 of the proposals, 
on the overall framework for credit risk mitigation techniques, draws the 
reader’s attention.  This states that the credit quality of the counterparty and 
the value of the collateral, “must not have a material positive correlation.  For 
example, securities issued by the counterparty – or by any related group entity 
                                                           
36 There is a more detailed issue here as to whether the Supervisory Haircuts presented are appropriate for 
developing country financial markets.  As Basel’s Market Risk Amendment (unchanged in Basel II) has been 
adapted by some developing countries for their own financial markets, the details of the comprehensive 
approach here may also need to be adapted.   27
– would provide little protection and so would be ineligible.  Under a strict 
interpretation, and given typical correlations in developing country bond 
markets, this may severely limit the use of a developing country government’s 
bonds as collateral to any loan in the same developing country
37.  Again the 
use of a developing country sovereign Government bond being used as 
collateral and the haircuts relevant for such instruments is left as an important 
topic of future research. 
 
3. Navigational Aids for the Sea of Standards 
 
In the above I have tried to give an idea as to what is new about Basel II and 
which elements of the Accord may be relevant to developing countries.  In this 
section, I will try to suggest how, depending on certain characteristics, 
countries may wish to adopt elements of the Basel standards as banking 
supervision and regulation is improved. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion, that the first priority should be to attempt 
to fully implement Basel II, Pillar 2.  Full implementation of Pillar 2, would 
imply a significant enhancement in Basel Core Principle compliance in many 
countries and this single policy would undoubtedly bring the best rewards in 
terms of improvements in banking sector safety. Moreover a country that has 
not implemented Basel II, Pillar 2 fully cannot be said to be implementing 
Basel II.  Having said that, it is too harsh a conclusion that a country that has 
not fully implemented the Basel Core Principles (or possibly even fully Pillar 
2) should stay away completely from Pillar 1 (or Pillar 3).  Indeed many Basel 
Committee countries are not fully compliant with the Basel Core Principles 
and are set to implement Basel II before 2006. This then suggests that, 
depending on BCP (and Pillar 2) compliance, different elements of Pillar 1 
might be gainfully adopted.   
 
A criticism that has been leveled against Basel II is that there is such a wide 
variation of Pillar 1 alternatives, that the essence of a standard is lost.  Hence, 
in what follows I try to define particular Islands within the Sea of Standards.  
In particular, I suggest that countries may wish to consider five basic 
alternatives: (1) Basel I, (2) Basel II-a, (3) Basel II-b (4) Basel II-CRB or (5) 
IRB. 
 
                                                           
37 This clause may well limit the subsidiary of an internationally active bank in a developing country using 
that government’s bonds as collateral against a domestic loan depending on the interpretation of the host 
supervisor.   28
Basel I is self-explanatory with the qualification that countries opting to stay 
on Basel I should of course continue to improve their compliance with the 
Basel Core Principles.  Moreover there is nothing to stop and possibly much to 
gain such countries adopting Basel II Pillars 2 and 3 and such counties may 
also consider introducing further measures to enhance market discipline.  The 































Basel II-a and Basel II-b are essentially differentiated by the degree of Basel 
Core Principle Compliance.  A Basel II-a country would implement the SSA 
of Basel’s Pillar 1 but strictly may not be implementing Basel II because there 
may be less than full compliance with Pillar 2 and in particular with 
Box 3: Five Islands in the Sea of Standards 
 
1. Basel I 
 
Continued work to enhance Basel Core Principle compliance and Basel II Pillars 2 and 3 and consideration of further measures to 
enhance market discipline. 
 
2. Basel II-a 
 
Elements: (i) Simplified Standardized Approach to basic credit risk measurement (ii) the Standardized Approach to Securitization
Risk, (iii) the Simple Approach to Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques and (iv) the Basic Indicator Approach to Operational Risk.
Countries adopting Basel II-a should be working towards full Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 compliance and to develop other measures of market
discipline. 
 
3. Basel II-b 
 
Elements:  (i) the Standardized Approach to basic credit risk measurement (ii) the Standardized Approach to Securitization Risk, (iii) 
the Simple or Comprehensive Approach to Credit Risk Mitigation (the latter with Supervisory Haircuts) and (iv) the Basic Indicator or 
the Standardized Approach to Operational Risk.  Full implementation of Pillars 2 and 3 should be a requisite to Pillar 1 
implementation. 
 
4. Basel II-Centralized Rating Based (CRB) 
 
Elements: (i) the Standardized Approach for basic credit risk measurement for capital (ii) the IRB approach to Securitization Risk,
using banks’ ratings according to a centralized scale, (iii) the Comprehensive Approach to Credit Risk Mitigation (the latter with
Supervisory Haircuts), (iv) the Basic Indicator or Standardized Approach to Operational Risk and (v) the Centralized Rating Based
approach such that bank ratings are used to set forward looking provisions compatible with the standardized approach for capital
(defined further in the text below).  
 
5. Basel II-IRB 
 
Elements: (i) the IRB for basic credit risk measurement for capital (ii) the IRB approach to Securitization Risk, using banks’ ratings 
according to a centralized scale, (iii) the Comprehensive Approach to Credit Risk Mitigation (with Supervisory or bank estimated 
haircuts), (iv) the Standardized Approach or Advanced Measurement Approaches to Operational Risk.   29
consolidated supervision. The country may however wish to implement the 
Standardized Approach to Securitization to allow banks to originate and to 
employ ratings on securitized instruments.  The standard would also include 
Basel I rules on mortgages (50% risk weight) and on retail portfolios (100% 
risk weight) rather than the reduced Basel II figures and would imply the 
added Basic Indicator operational risk capital requirement. 
 
A Basel II-b country would apply the Standardized Approach for underlying 
credit risk measurement and Securitization Risk and the Simple approach for 
credit risk mitigation and the Standardized Approach to Operational Risk.  
Here it would appear useful to insist on full Pillar 2 compliance and possibly 
also consolidated supervision of banks. 
 
I define a further potentially useful standard for countries that do not have 
significant rating penetration but have reasonably high compliance on the 
BCPs.  This I label as the Basel II-Centralized Rating Based (CRB) approach.  
Here the idea is that the regulators set a “rating scale” as some countries have 
already done in relation to provisioning requirements.  This scale may reflect 
the scale of a leading rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s.   
 
Banks are then asked to rate loans according to this centrally determined scale 
but the rating remains the rating of the bank.  One approach would be to have 
capital set according to the SSA or SA but then adjust individual loan 
provisions such that the sum of the estimated Expected Loss and Unexpected 
Loss equaled the sum of the SSA or SA given requirement plus provisions.  
The sum of Expected and Unexpected Loss should be estimated by the 
regulator through statistical means and complemented by a scenario or other 
approaches and may be checked against the Basel IRB curve.  The IRB curve 
gives the estimated expected and unexpected loss for a “standard” loan 
calibrated according to the Basel Committee’s estimates.  This would allow a 
regulator to be compliant with Basel II, to have an approach to setting banks’ 
reserving policies fully consistent with Basel’s IRB approach but without the 
degree of autonomy that Basel’s IRB gives to regulated institutions.  This 
standard also has advantages for those regulators that have autonomy in 
setting provisions but where capital is determined under the law
38 
39. 
                                                           
38 In some developing countries where this is the case, provisions are typically very high as the regulator has 
compensated explicitly or implicitly for a capital requirement possibly considered as too low for the context 
of the environment. 
39 A second approach would be to have provisions equal to expected loss and capital adjusted to the 
unexpected loss following the expected revisions of Basel II’s, IRB approach and using the revised Basel II   30
 
The CRB approach has the disadvantage that the bank has not developed the 
rating scale itself and the centrally determined scale may not suit each bank’s 
particular client base.  However it has the advantages of a) reflecting the 
current policies in some countries regarding how provisions are set, b) 
homogeneity of rating scales across banks allows for the regulator to monitor 
banks’ rating much more easily (indeed rules regarding how different banks 
rate the same client may be introduced or where there are discrepancies on an 
important borrower, the supervisor can initiate more informal discussions to 
seek a common understanding) and c) the regulator can aggregate information 
across banks more easily for the purposes of analysis and in order to calibrate 
the requirements. 
 
The final Island is the IRB approach.  This is the most advanced approach and 
requires greater supervisory resources and skills and hence greater BCP 
compliance. 
 
In choosing between these five Islands in the Sea of Standards, there are five 
dimensions of country characteristics that I suggest are critical: 
 
(a) The degree of BCP (and hence Pillar 2) compliance. 
 
(b) The current level of bank capital and the feasibility of increases in 
bank capital ratios in the shorter term 
 
(c) The penetration of rating agencies and the operation of the rating 
market in general 
 
(d) The size of, or the strength of the desire to develop domestic capital 
markets. 
 
(e) The availability of information and the degree of sophistication of 
banks and/or the supervisor in terms of assessing and monitoring 
loan-loss provisioning.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates a decision tree as a navigational aid between these different 
choices 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
curve.  However, the centralized scale sits uncomfortably with the language of Basel’s IRB approach where 
“internal rating” appears to have the bank determining both the scale and the rating. 
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Minimum BCP Compliance to
Comply with Pillars II and III and Monitor Operational Risk
The BASEL II Decision
 
a) On BCP Compliance: The higher the degree of BCP compliance, then the 
more complex approaches within Basel II may be realistically contemplated.  
However, the Basel Core Principles do not allow for an easy set of specific 
preconditions.  The exception to this is perhaps BCP 20, consolidated 
supervision.  As the spirit of Basel II is very much towards strengthening 
consolidation, BCP 20 might be considered as a pre-requisite for Basel II 
implementation.  Having said that, a country that has not implemented 
consolidated supervision may gain from implementing SSA or SA on a non-
consolidated basis.  The Basel II- standard is then defined for countries that 
are in this situation. 
 
With this qualification, the SSA does not imply a significant degree of 
additional complexity to Basel I, and not considering Pillar 2 compliance 
itself, the BCP compliance required to implement SSA should not then be 
more than Basel I.  The main differences lie in (1) monitoring Operational 
Risk (2) evaluating particular elements under national discretion
40 (3) and 
implementing and monitoring Pillar 3. 
 
                                                           
40 Here the most important relate to a) the 75% weighting for retail claims and the relevant portfolio limits b) 
the new 35% minimum on residential mortgages and c) the new rules on lending to sovereigns including 
banks’ own sovereign.     32
These considerations imply that a precondition for Basel II-a might be thought 
of as compliance with the “other risks” component of BCP to at least ensure 
that the supervisor has considered carefully risks including operational risk as 
well as the capacity to consider the elements under national discretion. 
 
The Standardized Approach increases the complexities of banking 
supervision.  The extra supervisory responsibility relates to the definition and 
monitoring of credit rating agencies, their credit ratings and the extra task of 
ensuring that banks use those ratings appropriately – both for underlying credit 
risks and for securitization risk and credit risk mitigation.  While this extra 
supervisory complexity may not appear large for countries with low rating 
penetration, there is an argument that it will divert limited resources and 
attention from where priorities should lie i.e.: enhancing Pillar 2 and basic 
BCP compliance. Only countries with some reasonable minimum standard of 
BCP compliance should then adopt the SA
41. 
 
There is a further and very significant step up required in supervisory skill and 
resources to successfully implement the IRB approaches.  Indeed, high BCP 
compliance and full Pillar 2 compliance should be thought of as the 
preconditions for IRB implementation.  As written, IRB gives a great deal of 
autonomy to banks to determine key parameters that feed into capital.  It also 
implies that supervisors should have the human capital and the information to 
check what banks are doing.  Moreover, as countries have experimented with 
different Basel I ratios (normally higher than the 8% recommended 
minimum), there is an important question as to whether Basel II is calibrated 
correctly for the setting of a developing country.  One precondition for 
successful IRB implementation is that the supervisor has the information, 
resources and skills to be able to demonstrate that the IRB approach is 
appropriately calibrated. 
 
b) On the feasibility of increasing capital requirements: if a country’s 
financial system has significant excess capital over Basel I ratios and 
increasing the requirement across banks presents little problem, or there is a 
                                                           
41 Some banking supervisors, including some of those that maintain centralized information on large 
borrowers payments’ histories for the purposes of monitoring provisioning, already supervise bank ratings.  
These supervisors will already be checking the banks’ ratings against those of ratings from rating agencies 
where these exist.  In this sense the extra supervisory task is related to BCP number 8 on loan evaluation and 
loan loss provisioning. On securitization risk, the supervisor will also wish to ensure that loan securitizations 
are properly rated depending on the types of structures employed.  Depending on the particular area of the 
securitization – e.g.: housing, credit card, car-loan - this, may well require specialist (and frequently 
international), rating expertise – and if securitization is common, this will also increase supervisors’ 
responsibilities and required resources.   33
desire to ensure that the financial system is more highly capitalized, then this 
calls for early SSA or SA implementation.  As reviewed, the SSA and SA will 
imply an increase in capital requirements for most developing countries as the 
added operational risk component will not be compensated either by lower 
underlying requirements on highly rated credits or by more generous 
treatments for particular credits, although this does depend to some extent on 
the distribution.  As SSA does not represent much in terms of supervisory 
complexity if there is no problem or a desire to increase regulatory capital 
ratios implementing SSA may be a useful way to do this. 
 
c) On rating agency penetration: The higher the penetration of rating 
agencies and the more confidence there is in the workings of the rating market 
then the more attractive the full standardized approach becomes relative to 
Basel 1, SSA or IRB.  Confidence in the rating market is increased given the 
depth of local capital markets so there is a relation between this and the 
following dimension.  The fear of using ratings for regulatory purposes is that 
the company being rated becomes the client and not investors that create the 
right incentives for the rating agency to develop and maintain a reputation.  
The increased use of ratings for regulatory purposes may then imply a greater 
chance that ratings will be “captured” and will be less than fully independent. 
The penetration of the rating industry, the confidence in the quality of the 
ratings and the depth of capital markets and the strength of the investor 
community will then be fundamental determinants as to whether a country will 
consider the Standardized Approach as appropriate. 
 
d) On capital market depth: Banks and security markets do not develop 
independently but are intimately tied together. As banks are normally critical 
to the development of security markets, providing banks with appropriate 
incentives for risk spreading may be an important part of the development of 
local security markets. For those countries that have some depth to capital 
markets, or a strong desire to develop them, there will also be greater 
motivation for Basel II implementation sooner rather than later.  In 
environments where BCP compliance is strong enough to consider Basel II 
implementation but not strong enough to think of more advanced approaches, 
such countries should consider carefully the Standardized Approach. 
 
The implementation of SA would serve to (a) to increase bank regulatory 
capital due to operational risk as reviewed and (b) provide for more 
appropriate treatment and incentives with respect to credit risk mitigation 
techniques and securitization risks. When considering securitization risk, the   34
penetration of the rating industry more generally may be less relevant.  If a 
bank is to securitise a retail portfolio this will normally be done in the context 
of obtaining a rating for the portfolio or the security created.  If a bank seeks 
insurance to mitigate credit risk, the guarantor (or the securities used as 
collateral) may have a rating even if general rating penetration in the country 
is low.  Hence the Standardized Approach may be more useful for the 
treatment of these elements, and hence the development of local security 
markets, rather than the treatment of the underlying risks in some developing 
countries.     
 
e) On loan loss provisioning expertise: According to Basel Core Principle 
number 8, banks should have a methodology for determining provisioning 
requirements and this should have a component that is forward looking.  
Supervisors may simply monitor banks’ systems in this regard but many 
regulators in developing countries (and Italy and Spain and in Europe) have 
developed centralized databases to monitor loan repayments and, in some 
cases, ask banks for a “rating” on a forward looking basis. To the extent that 
banks have developed these, “rating systems” and supervisors have developed 
appropriate databases and techniques to monitor them, they will be better 
placed than many developed countries to implement either the CRB or even 
the IRB approach. 
 
4. Cross-Border Issues 
 
As banking has become globalized and not just internationalized, cross-border 
regulatory and supervisory issues have grown
42.  While Basel II does not 
change the basic premises on which cross-border banking regulation has 
developed, it does create a set of interesting issues as noted in the recent “High 
Level Principles” – BCBS (2003b). This note makes clear that local host 
regulators may apply a different regulatory standard than home supervisors 
and banks, as they do today, may well be asked to satisfy the local regulations 
at the level of subsidiary or branch and the regulations of the home supervisor 
on a consolidated basis internationally
43.  This may imply dual regulatory 
                                                           
42 The BIS and others refer to internationalization as cross-border lending and globalization as banks setting 
up brick and mortar operations in multiple countries.  There has been a marked increase in globalization in the 
1990’s. 
43 We note that some developing countries ask branches to have capital as well as subsidiaries.  The choice 
between allowing branches or subsidiaries of international banks and whether branches should have local 
capital may depend largely on local bankruptcy legislation.  However, as recent cases (such as BCCI) have 
shown this is an area where there are still issues to be resolved and further international cooperation is 
required to attempt to reduce legal uncertainties.   35
treatment. And for an international bank in many different locations 
potentially multiple systems considering the many different alternatives 
offered in Basel II. On the other hand, and as the note suggests, there is clearly 
an argument that calls for greater homogeneity of regulatory treatment and 
reduction in regulatory costs both for supervisors and for banks. In practice 
this is likely to be something of a balancing act for home and host supervisors.   
 
BCBS (2003b) does not discuss what factors may push home and host country 
supervisors towards different ends of the single-treatment to dual-system 
spectrum.  The smaller an international bank is in a particular host, and the 
stronger the guarantee from the parent, then the more the local supervisor may 
wish to homogenize local regulations with those of the home supervisor. 
However, to the extent that the international bank is large for the host but 
small for the international bank and for the home regulator, then the more the 
local regulator should insist on rules that ensure adequate protection to the 
local financial system and that the local regulator can understand, can monitor 
and can enforce. 
 
One very stark example is with regards to operational risk.  For a large 
internationally diversified bank the operational risk of the whole bank is 
smaller than the sum of the operational risk of its constituent parts and indeed 
Basel II’s more advanced approaches now give explicit recognition of this.  
However, for a country with the subsidiary of a foreign bank, the relevant risk 
is the risk of the subsidiary not necessarily the diversified entity.  If the 
international bank gives an unconditional guarantee to support its subsidiary 
under all states of the world, then the relevant risk would indeed be that of the 
diversified bank. However, few international banks would wish to give such a 
guarantee and in practice the guarantee afforded to a subsidiary is not at all 
transparent
44.  Indeed, it is not even particularly transparent regarding a 
branch; although US law has now gone some way to defining the states of the 
world under which a US bank parent may not be held liable for liabilities of an 
overseas branch
45.  Failing a transparent and broad guarantee, many host 
countries will surely wish to ensure that operational risk is covered at the level 
of the subsidiary.   
 
                                                           
44 One reason why banks may not wish to extend such a guarantee is that they are then subject to a type of 
regulatory hold-up problem.  Once having entered and taken on sizeable liabilities and expending large sunk 
costs, local regulators or law makers may take decisions rendering their operations les sand less profitable and 
yet exit costs may be very large. 
45 See Del Negro and Kay (2002) for a discussion.   36
This argument is of course more general.  It covers credit risk as well.  
However, Basel II currently does not allow explicit benefits given a greater 
diversification of credit risk – the IRB approach is apparently calibrated for a 
(fixed) 20% correlation between default rates.  Again unless there is a 
transparent guarantee across the consolidated entity, host supervisors may 




A second dimension affecting the appropriate place to choose on the single 
versus dual regulatory treatment spectrum is compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles.  If the home and host country are close in terms of their compliance 
with the BCPs (and hence Pillar 2), then it is more likely the two regulators 
will adopt the same approach to Pillar 1.  However, if there is a wide 
difference regarding BCP compliance, then it is more likely that the home and 
host country will adopt different standards. 
 
Indeed, an over-riding objective of Basel II should be to use the cross-border 
supervisory issues as a springboard for supervisory cooperation and where 
possible for knowledge transfer in order to enhance BCP compliance.  One 
simple idea is that whenever an on-site inspection is made of an international 
bank in a developing country, then the host supervisor should have the option 
to send its own staff to accompany that inspection.  However, there are surely 
other modes of cooperation that can be developed and formalized to enhance 
knowledge transfer. 
 
The details of Basel II however also suggest particular issues.  Below I simply 
list some issues that may be particularly relevant to developing countries.   I 
start by assuming that both home and host are adopting the Standardized 
Approach (SA). 
 
Pillar 1: Both home and host adopt the Standardized Approach 
 
Many developing country companies have local ratings that are normally on 
local currency instruments issued in local markets.  It seems likely that local 
ratings will be employed by local regulators to fix capital standards under the 
SA.  However, as local ratings do not take into account convertibility and 
transfer risks and may be determined using a different scale, the host 
                                                           
46 Although we note that Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2003) argues that international diversification of credit 
risk may imply 20% is too high. 
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supervisor of an international bank may not accept the local currency ratings 
of corporate or other clients. 
 
Linked to this, if the subsidiary of an international bank lends to a developing 
country sovereign in own currency and funded in own currency the home 
supervisor must decide whether that will be treated with a zero risk weight by 
the consolidated entity.  Further, the same issue applies to the more favorable 
treatment of short-term inter-bank loans in local currency.  A set of further 
questions arise given the long list of items subject to “national discretion”.  
For example, if the local regulator chooses not to apply the 35% for mortgages 
(or the 75% for retail etc.) would the home regulator still allow the subsidiary 
of an international bank to adopt the 35%? 
 
Many developing countries may apply the SA multiplying the risk weight 
obtained in the Basel II tables relevant to the local rating by the relevant basic 
requirement.  Some developing countries currently have an 8% basic 
requirement but others have higher requirements.  This implies that the SA 
may not be so Standardized when it comes to cross-country comparisons.  
First there is an issue as to whether one country’s local AA is the same as 
another’s and second that rating is then converted into a capital charge using 
different basic requirements (8%, 10%, 11 % etc).  It seems further work is 
required here to consider the calibration issues involved across different 
countries where local ratings are employed. 
 
Pillar 1: Where the home country bank adopts IRB 
 
A major concern with the advanced approaches of Basel II is that there will be 
an inappropriate application of the advanced approaches where supervision is 
not strong enough to be able to monitor the more sophisticated rules on capital 
appropriately.  This fear is also relevant for the subsidiaries of foreign banks, 
especially where the foreign bank is large for the host country. 
 
In these circumstances it would appear paramount that the host supervisor 
adopts a system that it can monitor effectively. Only if the foreign bank gives 
a broad and transparent guarantee to its subsidiary or branch, then it might be 
appropriate for the host supervisor to lean more on the work of the home 
supervisor.  The home regulator clearly has to adopt an appropriate system for 
the consolidated international bank, however this should not imply a 
regulatory treatment by a host supervisor that the host is unable to monitor.  
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This argument implies, given the level of BCP compliance across many 
countries as detailed above, that it may be fairly common that an international 
bank is using an IRB approach on an international basis whereas particular 
host supervisors are adopting the SSA or SA approaches.  There is then an 
interesting issue as to whether the host supervisor would allow the bank to 
simply add the SSA or SA calculated capital requirement for the relevant 
subsidiary to the IRB calculated capital requirement for other parts of the bank 
and how consolidation would work in this case.  For subsidiaries that are not 
large relative to the international bank as a whole, allowing an international 
bank to use the SSA or the SA in particular jurisdictions may be appropriate in 
the interests of regulatory efficiency. 
 
In some cases, and particularly for the more sophisticated emerging 
economies, the host may adopt the IRB approaches for the subsidiaries or 
branches of foreign banks.  However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
regulatory treatment will be the same in the home and in the host country.  
Indeed it is extremely unlikely that a bank will consider it appropriate to use 
the same IRB scale for say US risks and developing country risks and crucial 
parameters will differ.  For example in the IRB Foundation approach it is very 
likely that the supervisor determined parameters such as exposure at default 
and loss given default will be different. 
 
Moreover, the host country may consider the Basel II IRB curves as giving too 
low a level of capital, if default probabilities from the US or other G10 
countries are employed and too high a level of capital if the default 
probabilities are estimated using local data.  In other words, the IRB 
calibration may simply not be appropriate given the very different risks. We 
come back to this point in the next section.  Or, as discussed above the host 
regulator may wish to have a centralized scale (referred to above as a CRB 
approach) to set either capital or provisions.  In conclusion, if home and host 
both allow the IRB approach, this does not necessarily mean that the bank will 
be facing a very homogenous regulatory system. 
 
Pillar 3 Issues 
 
In this overview paper, I have not entered into a detailed discussion on Pillar 
3.  However there is an interesting point to be made with respect to cross-
border issues.  Pillar 3, as written, gives significant autonomy to the bank to 
determine which subsidiaries are “material” to the group and hence whether 
more detailed information on the loan-book, on capital requirements and on   39
capital should be provided.  However, as implied in the general discussion in 
this section, what is material to the bank and what is material to a particular 
host country may be two different things.  Where an international bank has a 
subsidiary or a branch that is large for a particular host country, there are 
clearly advantages in ensuring that there is a high degree of transparency 
whether the subsidiary or branch is material to the group or not.  This 
argument suggests that it should be the host supervisor that should determine 
whether the subsidiary or a branch is material or not and not the bank or the 
host supervisor that will consider material only in relation to the overall bank.  
Again, unless an international bank has given a broad and transparent 
guarantee to its subsidiary or branch, then in the public interest of 
transparency and the ability of depositors and other creditors to perform 
adequate risk assessment, there is a strong case that Pillar 3 should apply to 
each subsidiary or branch in a host country. 
 
This argument is reinforced by noting that most foreign bank entry into 
developing countries has been effected through the purchase of a domestic 
institutions and not through start-up.  In turn this implies that valuable 
information has been lost.  Typically the domestic institution would have been 
quoted on the local stock market and would have other fixed liabilities 
outstanding such as bonds.  Foreign purchase is typically associated with stock 
market de-listing and depending on the bank and its own internal organization 
and funding strategy, local debt instruments may also cease to be issued or 
issued in much smaller quantities.  This implies that, in terms of the potential 
for risk assessment, the transparent market prices of equity and debt are 
replaced by the non-transparency of some measure of guarantee from the 
parent. 
 
This reasoning begs the question of whether the proposal here of Basel II 
Pillar 3 to apply at the level of subsidiary or branch in a host country – 
whether that subsidiary or branch is material or not to the international bank – 
really goes far enough.  Indeed, a complementary strategy would be to ask the 
subsidiary or branch to issue a certain quantity of debt locally akin to 
Argentina’s subordinated debt regulation.  This would at least ensure that 
there was some market and hence price discovery on the risk of the subsidiary 
augmented by the parent’s guarantee. 
 
5. On IRB Recalibration in developing countries 
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As Basel I has been applied around the world with different basic capital 
requirements – 8% and higher – there is a natural question as to whether the 
calibration of Basel II is appropriate for developing countries where credit and 
other risks are generally higher.  In a series of recent papers with coauthors 
from the Central Bank of Argentina, and in a project sponsored by the World 
Bank including the Central Banks of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, a set of 
related methodologies have been developed that may be applied to test the 




The different approaches have two elements in common, (a) the estimation of 
loan default probabilities typically using historical data on loan default rates 
and econometric techniques such as a logit or probit analysis and (b) the 
application of a credit risk portfolio model
48.  An alternative is to use the 
Carey (2002) sampling methodology to estimate credit risk directly. Clearly a 
pre-requisite in each case is the availability of reliable and appropriate data. 
 
This data may exist at the level of the bank.  However in some countries, 
extensive loan databases have been built up.  These are reviewed in a recent 
book, Miller (2003).  While the origins of these databases are various and their 
uses multiple, one increasingly common use is to monitor provisions.  In other 
words, the databases are used to check which loans are past due and to set and 
monitor bank provisioning policies. 
 
Some countries have gone further than this and asked banks to provide a 
forward-looking rating for borrowers according to a standardized scale.  In 
this case the ratings of different banks for the same borrower can be compared 
very easily and discrepancies investigated.  These databases have then become 
important tools of banks’ reserving policies. 
 
These types of public credit registries are also an extremely useful source of 
information to estimate probabilities of default and other parameters to feed in 
to credit risk models.  For each of the techniques described above, combined 
with other assumptions (e.g.: on underlying correlations and on loss given 
                                                           
47 See Falkenheim and Powell (2003), Balzarotti, Falkenheim and Powell (2002), Balzarotti, Castro and 
Powell (2003) all on historical Argentine data and Marquez (2002) on Mexican data.  See also xxxx for a very 
similar study on Italian data.  
48 Such models include Creditrisk+ (often referred to as an actuarial model and focused more on risk than on  
pricing, developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products a part of Credit Suisse First Boston) and  
Creditmetrics (developed by JP Morgan offshoot, Riskmetrics, perhaps simpler conceptually than Creditrisk+ 
but more taxing in terms of data and focused on pricing as well as on risk).   41
default) the final result is a curve that represents the loss probability 
distribution function of losses for a portfolio of loans.  We will refer to this as 
the Supervisor’s credit risk model.   
 
To consider a concrete example, suppose the result for a particular portfolio is 
a curve that tells the analyst, for a particular bank portfolio of say $100 
million, what is the probability of losing $1 million, $5 million, $10 million 
etc.  There may then be a 10% chance of losing $1 million, a 1% chance of 
losing $5 million, and a 0.1% chance of losing $10 million. The Basel II IRB 
curves are apparently calculated using a Value at Risk rule that asks the 
question, what is the maximum amount that might be lost considering 99.9% 
of the distribution or what is the amount that might be lost that corresponds to 
a 0.1% probability.  This maximum, or Value at Risk, in the above example is 
then $10 million. 
 
The value at risk is then a different concept to the expected loss.  The expected 
loss is the loss that one would normally expect. It is the average or mean of the 
distribution.  The value at risk is the expected loss plus an extra amount, often 
referred to as the unexpected loss, up to a particular statistical tolerance – in 
the above example 99.9%.  The Basel II IRB curves, as stated in the 
Consultative Paper number 3 are calibrated to cover the whole value at risk or 
in other words both the expected loss and the unexpected loss. 
 
This has led to some controversy, as the more modern theory has it that 
provisions should be forward looking and cover expected loss and hence it 
appears that there may be double counting.  On the other hand, given the lack 
of an international agreement on provisioning rules, one can understand the 
position of the Consultative Paper number three as one of safety first.  
However, the result of recent discussions is that Basel II will eventually allow 
banks that can show provisions in excess of expected loss, to reduce capital 
accordingly and hence avoid double counting. 
 
This discussion is important in terms of the calibration of Basel’s IRB curves. 
As the IRB curves are calibrated with a set of parameters that are only 
partially known, any recalibration looks potentially quite difficult.  However, 
Balzarotti, Castro and Powell (2002) develops a reasonably simple way to do 
this for those unfortunate enough not to be privy to the full set of parameters 
and methodology employed. 
 
In broad terms, the methodology consists of the following:   42
 
1.  The sum of expected and unexpected loss for a bank’s portfolio 
or a bank sub-portfolio is estimated using the techniques 
described above – using the Supervisor’s credit risk model. 
2.  The Basel II IRB approach is simulated using the same default 
probabilities and loss given default assumptions as used in (1) 
but employing the Basel IRB curve directly to calculate the 
capital requirement – which in CP3 is also equal to expected 
plus unexpected loss. 
3.  Given sufficient observations on (1) and (2) (i.e.: given a large 
enough number of banks or if not using the sub-portfolios of 
available banks), a regression can be performed between the 
estimated capital requirement, using the Supervisor’s model, 
and the Basel II calculated requirement. 
4.  If the Supervisor’s model is close to one of the standard 
techniques (that lie behind the Basel II curve), then the 
regression should give a close-fit and the regression coefficient 
will yield a conversion factor from the Basel II formula 
produced capital requirement to the estimate provided by the 
Supervisor’s model.  This conversion factor can then be 
applied to Basel II’s curve for application of the IRB approach. 
 
Once the Basel II curve is recalibrated there are then various possibilities in 
terms of implementing revised capital regulations.  One is to set provisions by 
means of a rule to simulate the expected loss and publish a revised Basel II 
IRB curve (netting out the expected loss as the final Accord is expected to 
allow) as the capital requirement.  Banks may then generate their own default 
probabilities (and possibly other parameters) as per Basel’s IRB.  However, if 
a rating based provisioning system already exists, then the Centralized Rating 
Based approach discussed above has the tremendous advantage of building on 
the known technology and secondly enhances the ease of monitoring banks’ 
credit risk assessments.  The disadvantage is that the centralized scale may not 
fit so well a particular bank’s set of clients. 
 
Let us assume that the CRB approach is followed.  Then based on the 
centralized rating scale, the regulator may set a rule for provisioning to 
simulate the expected loss and for capital to simulate the unexpected loss 
according to the adjusted Basel curve.  Let us take an example of a risky 
uncollateralized loan, perhaps to a developing country small or medium sized 
enterprise.  Let us assume that the total value at risk is 18%.  If the expected   43
loss is 6%, then provisions should be set at 6% and the appropriate capital 
requirement would be 12%. 
 
However, this may be felt by some not to comply with Basel II’s IRB as the 
rating scale is centralized.  Moreover some developing country jurisdictions 
may find it difficult to obtain the necessary authority from Congress or other 
relevant authority to implement such a complex system or give the supervisor 
the necessary autonomy to set capital in that way.  An alternative approach, as 
outlined in the previous section, is for the country to adopt the Basel II’s  SA 
or even SSA for Pillar 1.  For most loans this will give a capital requirement of 
8%, except in the unlikely event that the loan has a rating.  Then, the above 
technique can be used to set forward looking provisions.  In the example cited 
if the Basel SA gave a requirement of 8%, then the forward looking provisions 
would have to equal 10%.  Although it is often difficult to reconcile logically, 
while many developing country supervisors do not have the autonomy to set 
capital, they tend to have more autonomy to set provisions.  This would allow 
a country to be compliant with Basel II by the letter and yet the total bank 
reserving policy would still be that equal to a Basel II (CP3), IRB type rule of 
Expected plus Unexpected Loss. 
 
This process may sound simple.  However, the data and other requirements are 
large and there is also a tremendous amount of work that is required to ensure 
that the data is of reasonable quality and that each step in the process is 
carefully checked.  In the case of Argentina, to develop a public credit registry 
with a reasonable standard in terms of data quality and of a useful size to 
cover most of the banks’ loan portfolios took a process of some 5-6 to  years.  
And the data that was then available to truly test the Basel calibration was 
only for about a two year period before the crisis began - when the database 
suffered once more from serious problems of non-reporting from some 
institutions, changing definitions of variables and generally a poorer quality 
consistency.  A two year period is clearly an insufficient one to truly test a 
capital rule and the results were only thought of as indicative by the Argentine 
authorities. 
 
However, independently of Basel II, the learning process on the part of bank 
supervisors and bank regulators to understand the loss probability distributions 
of different banks, which in turn depend on the distribution of the default 
probabilities and the concentration of each bank’s loan portfolios and how 
they changed over time, and how that started to feed into thinking regarding   44
appropriate provisioning and capital rules for individual banks was a highly 
promising one.  
 
The above procedures come with the standard health warning that these types 
of VAR analyses should only be thought of as one component in terms of how 
to fix capital requirements
49.  Still, it is hoped that this exercise may be of 
interest to countries with reasonable sophisticated banking supervisors 





This paper has attempted to provide navigational tools for developing 
countries and their advisors regarding the decision of whether to adopt Basel 
II and if so, how. For many countries, Basel II represents a considerable 
challenge. The first priority should be the full implementation of Basel I and 
the Basel Core Principles (BCPs).  Basel II should only be considered after 
some reasonable BCP compliance is attained such that scarce supervisory 
resources are not diverted from improving basic banking supervision.  Basel 
II, Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 compliance should be seen as at least as important as 
Pillar 1 compliance.  Moreover, in countries where traditional supervision is 
weak, countries should consider going beyond Basel II, Pillar 3 to capture the 
complementarities between regulatory and market discipline. 
 
Having said that, the simpler approaches of Basel II, Pillar 1 may be feasible 
for countries with a reasonable compliance with the BCPs.  The Simplified  
Standardized Approach (SSA) does not imply a significant increase in 
complexity than Basel I in terms of credit risk assessment.  SSA does imply 
that operational risks would have to be supervised (of course, they should be 
under the BCPs anyway) and would most likely imply higher capital 
requirements for developing countries as the operational risk requirement 
would not be compensated by a reduced requirement for credit risk. 
 
                                                           
49 Argentina’s experience shows this very clearly.  Credit risk capital requirements did not take into account 
the full currency risk component of credit risk that resulted from a maxi-devaluation.  Some estimates have it 
that bank capital would have provided protection for a 40% devaluation – close to estimates of the real 
exchange rate over-valuation. Nor were capital requirements designed to protect banks from the effects of the 
asymmetric pessification of banks’ assets and liabilities or the entire risk of default on public sector assets. 
Argentina placed a 100% risk weight (11.5% capital requirement) on loans to Argentine provinces and a 
lower requirement on loans and bonds of the Federal Government.   45
However, under SSA, developing countries may not wish to reduce risk 
weights on mortgages and retail loans depending on observed default rates and 
default rate correlations. Moreover, for countries that wish to grow capital 
markets, the Basel II approaches for credit risk mitigation and securitization 
risk that use credit ratings may be more attractive even if rating penetration 
more generally is poor.  Hence a useful standard (in this paper labeled Basel 
II-a) may be 1) SSA for basic credit risk evaluation (but with Basel I risk 
weights for mortgages and retail credits), 2) the Simple Approach for Credit 
Risk Mitigation, 3) the Standardized Approach for Securitization Risk, and 4) 
the Basic Indicator approach for Operational Risk. 
 
The Standardized Approach (SA) for basic credit risk becomes more attractive 
for countries with deeper rating industries and higher BCP compliance such 
that supervisors can take on the extra task of ensuring that the rating industry 
is working reasonably well.  A standard Basel II-b is then defined that consists 
of 1) the SA for basic credit risk, 2) the Simple or Comprehensive Approach 
to Credit Risk Mitigation, 3) the Standardized Approach to Securitization 
Risk, and 4) the Basic Indicator (or possibly Standardized Approach) for 
Operational Risk. 
 
Still, it is clear that many developing countries fall between two stools. On the 
one hand, rating penetration is low so that the SA will yield little in terms if 
linking bank capital to risk.  On the other hand, the IRB approaches look 
complex and most developing countries will not wish to implement these more 
advanced approach for many years to come.  In view of this, a Centralized 
Rating Based (CRB) is proposed here as a transition tool toward the more 
advanced approaches. 
 
The CRB approach calls for the supervisor to set the rating scale in terms of 
default probabilities and how they map to a capital requirement
50.  Banks 
would then rate their clients according to this standardized scale.  This would 
not be an IRB approach as such because although the ratings would be the 
ratings of the individual banks, the rating scale would be determined by the 
regulator.  IRB calls for both the scale and the rating to be determined by the 
bank.  The drawback of this proposal is that an individual bank may not have 
the exact rating scale it wishes.  However, the tremendous advantage is that 
the regulator could easily compare a) the ratings of the same borrower by 
different banks, b) the average ratings of different banks, c) banks’ ratings in 
                                                           
50 This might follow the IRB curve as published or a developing country may wish to recalibrate to impose 
higher requirements as many have done with Basel I.   46
the same sector, d) banks’ ratings in different regions, and e) banks’ ratings for 
a particular instrument, etc.  Thus it would be much easier to monitor and 
supervise. 
 
For countries that wish to implement the CRB approach but be fully Basel II 
compliant according to the letter and not just the spirit of the proposals, then 
one possibility is to adopt the Standardized Approach for capital and use the 
CRB approach to define provisions.  Under recent changes to the Basel II 
proposals, if the CRB approach is calibrated to give provisioning levels equal 
to the full “value at risk” minus the Standardized Approach’s capital 
requirement, then a country would have a fully Basel II compliant and rational 
system where banks’ reserving policies were roughly equal to the value at 
risk
51.  Such an approach would build very naturally on the types of public 
databases many countries have built up to monitor and enforce provisioning 
rules. This standard might be labeled Basel II-CRB. 
 
There are then a group of developing countries that will indeed wish to 
implement the IRB approach - at least for a small group of larger and more 
sophisticated banks.  These countries will of course need to dedicate 
substantial resources to consider carefully the IRB proposals, possibly 
recalibrate them for the task at hand, and monitor and supervise them 
effectively.  There will also be a substantial cost for banks in these countries in 
terms of regulatory costs for the data and systems required.  Only countries 
that score well in terms of BCP compliance will be in a position to fully reap 
the rewards of these more advanced approaches. 
 
One criticism of Basel II has been that there are so many alternatives that the 
essence of a standard has been lost.  It is hoped by defining the islands of a) 
Basel I, b) Basel II-a, c) Basel II-b, d) Basel II-CRN, and e) Basel II-IRB that 
countries may navigate more effectively through the sea of standards. 
 
Finally, given the globalization of banking, Basel II will also focus the minds 
of supervisors on a set of important cross-border issues.  These range from 
particular definitions in different countries regarding both the SA and the IRB 
approaches to broad issues regarding the degree of desired homogeneity of 
approaches in home and host countries.  From the standpoint of a developing 
country, if a bank (whether a subsidiary or a branch depending on local 
legislation) is large in the local financial system and there is no broad, 
                                                           
51 The roughly comes from the use of a reserving policy for individual loans for a portfolio of credit risks – as 
Basel II’s IRB approach also approximates to the full Value at Risk of a loan portfolio.   47
transparent and legally binding guarantee from the parent, then the local 
regulator will no doubt wish to ensure a regulatory regime is in place that is 
appropriate and that it can monitor effectively and enforce.  It will be useful 
for regulators to define such banks as “material” for the purposes of Pillar 3, 
even if the bank in the host country is very small relative to the size of the 
entire international bank.  Moreover, if foreign bank entry has been 
accompanied by delisting and a reduction in the market information available 
regarding the local bank, then local regulators may wish to consider other 
techniques to obtain market signals on the risk of subsidiaries of international 
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P1   BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION 
C1   Chapter 1 Objectives, Autonomy, Powers, and Resources (CP 1) 
CP1   Principle 1. Objectives, Autonomy, Powers, And Resources. An effective system of banking supervision will 
have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks. Each such 
agency should possess operational independ 
SP11   Principle 1(1). An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency 
involved in the supervision of banks. 
SP12   Principle 1(2). Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate resources. 
SP13   Principle 1(3). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to 
authorization of banking establishments and their ongoing supervision. 
SP14   Principle 1(4). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including powers to address 
compliance with laws, as well as safety and soundness concerns. 
SP15   Principle 1(5). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including legal protection for 
supervisors. 
SP16   Principle 1(6). Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such 
information should be in place. 
C2   Chapter 2 Licensing and Structure (CPs 2-5) 
CP2   Principle 2. Permissible Activities. The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as 
banks must be clearly defined, and the use of the word "bank" in names should be controlled as far as possible. 
CP3   Principle 3. Licensing Criteria. The licensing authority must have the right to set criteria and reject applications for 
establishments that do not meet the standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an 
assessment of the banking 
CP4   Principle 4. Ownership 
CP5   Principle 5. Investment Criteria  
C3   Chapter 3 Prudential Regulations and Requirements (CPs 6-15) 
CP6   Principle 6. Capital Adequacy  
CP7   Principle 7. Credit Policies 
CP8   Principle 8. Loan Evaluation and Loan-Loss Provisioning  
CP9   Principle 9. Large Exposure Limits  
CP10   Principle 10. Connected Lending  
CP11   Principle 11. Country Risk  
CP12   Principle 12. Market Risks  
CP13   Principle 13. Other Risks  
CP14   Principle 14. Internal Control and Audit  
CP15   Principle 15. Money Laundering  
C4   Chapter 4 Methods of On-Going Supervision (CPs 16-20) 
CP16   Principle 16. On-Site and Off-Site Supervision  
CP17   Principle 17. Bank Management Contact  
CP18   Principle 18. Off-Site Supervision  
CP19   Principle 19. Validation of Supervisory Information  
CP20   Principle 20. Consolidated Supervision  
C5   Chapter 5 Information Requirements (CP 21) 
CP21   Principle 21. Accounting Standards  
C6   Chapter 6 Formal Powers of Supervisors (CP 22) 
CP22   Principle 22. Remedial Measures  
C7   Chapter 7 Cross-Border Banking (CP 23-25) 
CP23   Principle 23. Globally Consolidated Supervision  
CP24   Principle 24. Host Country Supervision  
CP25   Principle 25. Supervision Over Foreign Banks' Establishments    51
Figure A1: Developing Country Compliance by 
Key Basel Core Principle 
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